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Kantian deontology makes at least three central claims: (1) All humans are ends in themselves, (2) All 
humans have moral obligations, and (3) Morality (the categorical imperative) is a rational endeavor. 
However, the universal claims of Kantian deontology become suspect when we consider the mentally 
impaired who, in some cases, cannot meet the rationality requirements implicit in the categorical 
imperative. In this paper, I argue that Kantian deontology cannot account for the entirety of the human 
population lest it exclude the mentally impaired as either non-moral agents or sub-human entities. I then 
suggest that by adopting the paradigm of virtue ethics, we can sufficiently avoid this problem and 
account for the dignity and moral agency of the mentally impaired. Finally, I consider one objection to 





I.  A Short Preface 
 
Before I officially begin, I would like to acknowledge that in considering this particular 
population—the mentally impaired—I approach very tumultuous ground. Therefore, I 
would like to state quickly my reasons for thinking about this topic. For one, I am the 
older sibling of a severely handicapped brother who is blind, autistic, and mentally 
impaired. So, much of this paper is fueled by my actual frustration with contemporary 
and historic ethical thinking: that it usually ignores or does not account for the mentally 
impaired. Secondly, having worked in the classroom with mentally impaired students, I 
believe the picture I am laying out has actual precedent for what educators and 
caretakers do. Finally, I would like to clarify who I mean by “mentally impaired”. Such 
disabilities have a wide spectrum, but I basically mean an individual who does not have 
the cognitive capacity to ensure their own physical wellbeing but has the ability to 
speak, form sentences, and engage in elementary reasoning. 
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II. Virtue: What is it? 
 
The concept of virtue is notoriously broad. Aristotle, perhaps the first to present a 
systematic virtue ethics, considers magnanimity—greatness of soul—to be a paramount 
virtue, whilst Aquinas—in a rare moment of departure from Aristotle—maintains that 
humility (a kind of lowness of soul) is essential for human moral perfection. And virtue 
lists dot the pages of history, contradicting one another, claiming different ends for the 
human race.1  But accounting for this wide variance is not essential to this paper; rather, 
it is important that we note a general feature of virtue: it is concerned with ends. The 
basic assumption behind virtue ethics is that human beings have an inherent purpose in 
their natures, and virtues are the kinds of excellent-making properties that reshape and 
refine our nature in such a way that we are able to meet those ends to which our nature 
directs us.2  
 
In the development of this paper, we will therefore be utilizing the mechanics of virtue 
of ethics. Specifically we will consider appropriateness: the cognitive endeavors and 
moral responsibilities of an individual are dependent upon their ability (especially taken 
here to be cognitive ability) to engage in practical reason (the implementation of 
virtuous practices).3  We will analyze the benefits of a virtue ethics paradigm by 
examining, all too sparsely, the apparatus of Kantian deontology, and I will argue that 
Kantian deontology, because of its rigorous rationality requirements, effectively 
excludes a portion of human beings—the mentally impaired—from true moral agency. 
The upshot of this is that the Kantian must either weaken the universal claims of 
Kantian ethics, or she must accord to the mentally impaired a lesser degree of human 
dignity. Finally, we will consider why the apparatus of virtue ethics, particularly the 
notion of appropriateness, allows for the mentally impaired to retain their dignity and 
allows for the mentally impaired to have greater moral worth overall.  
 
III. What is Kantian Deontology? 
 
The distinctive paradigm of the Kantian deontological system is rationality. The 
exercise of reason is essential to the moral life, and the moral life—the laws and 
obligations which rational, moral agents follow—are based upon rational standards. 
Kant writes:  
                                                          
1 For further discussion, which we cannot cover here, see: Adams, Robert Merihew, 2006, A 
Theory of Virtue, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
2 Audi, Robert, 2009, “Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action”, Philosophical Issues, 19: 1–20. 
 
3 For a discussion of the cognitive aspects of virtue, see: Bailey, Olivia, 2010, “What Knowledge 
is Necessary for Virtue?”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (2): 1–17. 
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For inasmuch as morality serves as a law for us only insofar as we are rational beings, it 
must also be valid for all rational beings.4  
 
So for Kant, the moral law is not only applicable to us only if we are rational beings, 
but also, it must be “valid” for us; that is, it must be accessible to us. Kant, of course, is 
implying that “ought implies can.” Freedom is necessary if the moral law is to be valid, 
for no moral agent has actual moral responsibility if that moral agent cannot follow 
through with the moral law. Thus, freedom of the will is important to Kant’s ethical 
conception, and for Kant, it is reason that accompanies this freedom of the will.5  His 
classic categorical imperative is the culmination of the union of the free will and 
human reason. Kant formulates the Categorical Imperative in several ways, but for 
brevity’s sake, here is the first formulation: “act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”6  The 
process of this formulation goes something like this. I formulate a maxim that displays 
my reasons for acting as I wish to. I transpose that maxim into a universal law that I 
envision to be morally binding on all moral agents. I then consider whether this maxim 
makes sense in the world, and whether I could reasonably will my acting upon this 
maxim. And if the answer is positive, then said action is morally permissible. 
 
To add to our account, a second formulation of the categorical imperative: never act in 
such a way as to treat a fellow human, whether ourselves or others, as a means only but 
always as an end in themselves.7  Again I will leave this as it stands. It is enough that 
we have sketched the rational method of coming to the first instantiation of the 
categorical imperative, but this second formulation need only stand as a facet of Kant’s 
morality, and one which we desire to preserve for good reason.  
 
This is a very cursory account of Kant’s moral system,8 but we are only highlighting 
those aspects of Kant’s ethical thought that are directly relevant to our critique. We can 
notice a few things about Kant’s system. First of all, all humans are ends in themselves, 
according to the second formulation of the categorical imperative. We should treat 
human moral agents as ends in themselves because they have a certain dignity, and this 
dignity is a product of their moral status. This moral status is, as we observed at the top 
of this section, a product of humanity’s rational capacities. Secondly, all humans have 
                                                          
4 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:421 
5 For further discussion, see Aune, Bruce, 1979, Kant's Theory of Morals. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton U. P.; Beck, Lewis White, 1960, A Commentary on Kant's “Critique of Practical 
Reason” Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Herman, Barbara, 1993, The Practice of Moral 
Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P. 
6 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:421 
7 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:423 
8 For a fuller account, one which we cannot give here, see: Rawls, John, 1989, “Themes in Kant's 
Moral Philosophy,” in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, E. Förster, ed., pp. 81-113. Stanford: 
Stanford U. P. 
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moral obligations just because humans have rational capacities that enable moral 
reasoning. And thirdly, this moral reasoning enables us to reason out the categorical 
imperative—to form moral propositions. Finally, we have noted that Kant’s system is 
meant to apply universally; that is, it is meant to apply to all of humanity.  
 
IV. The Argument 
 
We have laid out three deontological premises above:  
 
1. All humans are ends in themselves. 
2. All humans have moral obligations.  
3. The categorical imperative (the formation of moral propositions) is a rational 
endeavor. 
 
We observed Kant claiming above that “[the moral law] must also be valid for all 
rational beings.” And it seems like Kant’s system meets these requirements, but I am 
not convinced. There are members of the human race who are not able to fulfill Kant’s 
rationalistic standards; however, it is not clear that they are entirely irrational beings, so 
they must have some moral standing, right? Let’s introduce a claim about some 
mentally impaired individuals (those who are sufficiently cognitively impaired to 
prevent their caring for themselves but still able to engage in basic reasoning): 
 
4. If an individual is mentally impaired (in the manner stipulated above), then 
that mentally impaired individual cannot fulfill (3). 
 
Because the formation of the categorical imperative—coming to know the moral law—
requires a certain amount of cognitive and rational power, those who do not possess 
such power are incapable of engaging in the kind of rational endeavor that the Kantian 
thinks all humans must engage in. It is simply not expected that a mentally impaired 
person be able to engage in the kind of moral reasoning that Kant requires in the 
formation of the categorical imperative. Let us take the argument a step further: 
 
5. If a mentally impaired individual cannot meet (3), then that same mentally 
impaired individual cannot meet (2).  
 
I rely here upon the notion that ought implies can which Kant also insinuates, as 
mentioned above. While there is some controversy around this notion, I think it a staple 
of any ethical theory that it should allow for the capability of meeting its edicts; after 
all, if we posit a moral code that we cannot meet, it does not seem to be practical, and if 
anything, morality should be a catalyst of human flourishing. In any event, if the 
mentally-impaired individual cannot engage in the categorical imperative—cannot 
know the universal law, then they do not have moral obligations because they cannot, 
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under any circumstances, come to know that a certain action violates a duty. That they 
ought not to lie is unknown to them; thus, they cannot be held culpable for lying under 
a deontic system. And finally, we come to our last premise: 
 
6. If a mentally impaired individual cannot meet (2), then that same mentally 
impaired individual cannot meet (1). 
 
Because a mentally impaired individual does not have moral obligations—or at least 
does not have all of the moral obligations that most other humans have—then that 
individual does not seem to meet the description of a human moral agent. And a human 
moral agent has moral status because that individual has moral obligations and the 
ability to reason morally. But since the mentally-impaired individual has none of these 
capacities, then that individual’s moral status is suspect. I do not mean to imply here 
that the Kantian must call these individuals monsters or beasts; rather, they do not have 
the same kind of dignity that other humans do, and that is a problem.  
 
Why is this a problem? It refutes the Kantian claim of universality. Unless the mentally 
impaired are not human, then the claim that all humans are moral agents must be 
refuted, and likewise, that moral obligations are universal must be restricted to a lesser 
claim: moral obligations are applicable to most human beings. But this is a weaker 
claim, one which endangers the objectivity which Kant strives for. Not all humans are 
ends in themselves (or have the same moral dignity), and not all humans have moral 
obligations. Either the Kantian stipulates non-universal moral obligations, or the 
Kantian accepts a limitation of the moral dignity and worth of mentally impaired 
individuals.  
 
But this seems to intuitively go against our practice. Often enough, we treat mentally 
impaired individuals with enough cognitive function to have some moral awareness as 
culpable for particular actions; however, these individuals cannot engage in the kind of 
reasoning with the categorical imperative requires. So intuitively, we assign to them 
moral obligation because they are conscious of their violations of certain ethical 
principles, but they cannot sufficiently reason to these principles; instead, their 
instructors and caretakers must inform them. I will return to this situation later, but first 
let’s look at a potential solution to the problem.  
 
V.  A Virtuous Solution 
 
My proposed solution is one that relies on appropriateness, a feature of virtue ethics. 
Appropriateness refers to the fluidity of virtue ethics; that is, that while the end of 
human nature is a virtuous end, how one achieves the virtuous end will be determined 
upon a case by case basis. So, for instance, if one warrior is exceedingly cowardly and 
another is exceedingly reckless, then the coward will need to undergo a different kind 
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of “training” (one which is appropriate) in order to achieve the virtuous habit of 
courageous action, better defined as the disposition to act courageously. Here’s the 
revised argument altered by the inclusion of appropriateness: 
 
1. All humans are ends in themselves. (I take this to be an incontrovertible 
claim, for we are ends in the eyes of both Kant and virtue ethics.) 
2. All humans have appropriate moral obligations.   
 
This is a claim that places a restriction on universality. “Appropriate moral obligations” 
are thus those that are tailored in such a way that the individual nature of a person 
carries the inherent capacities that enable the individual to fulfill these moral 
obligations. The application to the mentally impaired is obvious. They have appropriate 
moral obligations given their cognitive status; or rather, they have moral 
responsibilities appropriate to the capacities of their person. Here we are again relying 
upon the principle that ought implies can. My brother, for instance, cannot reason 
effectively that to the conclusion that murder is impermissible, but he can be held 
responsible for lying since he understands fully well that he ought not to do it.  
 
Morality is an appropriate rational endeavor (proportioned to the cognitive capacities 
and ends of an individual). 
 
This naturally follows from the second premise. Morality is a rational endeavor which 
is possible for the individual to carry out; thus, the individual ought to recognize those 
moral duties which they can reasonably conclude. This might be construed as a kind of 
epistemic duty, and the mention of that warrants another conversation, but for our 
purposes, we should note that in any ethical system individuals have certain obligations 
to act in certain ways because they know the proper way to act. Finally, I take the rest 
of the argument to follow easily enough. If a mentally impaired individual can engage 
in moral reasoning at all, then there is an appropriate rational endeavor they can carry 
out, which means that there are appropriate moral obligations that suite them, and 
lastly, if they can engage as moral agents (and need not meet a strict rationality 
requirement), then they can be accorded full human dignity. So, here it is for posterity: 
 
1. If an individual is mentally impaired, then the mentally impaired individuals 
can fulfill 3. 
2. If the mentally impaired individual can fulfill 3, then the mentally impaired 
individual can fulfill 2.  
3. If the mentally impaired individual can fulfill 2, then the mentally impaired 
individual has an end and appropriate dignity.  
 
We have therefore concluded that by altering the rigid claims to universality that Kant 
makes, we can account for a portion of the human population that would have been 
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excluded from equal moral dignity. An interesting note: we should notice that by 
weakening the universality of Kant’s claims, we have increased the coverage of our 
moral system, and likewise, we should note that the reverse is true: when we make 
strict universal claims of morality and reason, we weaken the universal coverage of that 
ethical system. So, in sum, the issue with the strict rational morality of Kant is that it is 
actually too exclusive to faithfully account for the totality of the human species.  
 
But this leads us to ask: what of virtue? The gist of the above argument displays the 
ability of virtue ethics to appropriately account for the multiplicity of human existences 
while still remaining consistent with its own standards. Take the mentally impaired, for 
instance. We noted earlier that it seems peculiar that, even though they do not have the 
cognitive capacities to engage in the rigorous rational practices of Kantian deontology, 
we still believe them to have moral obligations on a case by case basis; that is, we think 
them to have appropriate moral obligations (premise 2). And likewise, those especially 
who are involved in the education or caretaking of the mentally impaired encourage the 
mentally impaired to cultivate particular habits or dispositions that are appropriate to 
their cognitive capacities which accord with the moral obligations they have (premise 
3). In that sense, educators and caretakers attempt to inculcate virtue. Now virtue can be 
partially a rational endeavor where one engages in theoretical reflection on the virtues, 
but we should note that the moral agents need not engage in this theoretical reflection to 
be virtuous; rather, they must cultivate the virtuous dispositions and become virtuous. 
In that sense, the mentally impaired are entirely capable of cultivating virtue 
appropriate to their cognitive capacities and abilities—especially with the help of 
others, and this is exactly why they too, like the rest of us, have dignity—they are moral 
agents: ends in themselves.  
 
VI.  A Quick Objection and Reply 
 
Now the Kantian may respond with a critique of my virtue ethics response which goes 
something like this: “You mention moral obligations even as you discuss virtue ethics, 
but certainly you cannot mean to suggest that humanity, including the mentally 
impaired, have a duty to be virtuous. For if this is the case, then not only is virtue ethics 
merely the byproduct of Kantian ethics, but your portrait of our ethical lives succumbs 
to the same critique you leveled against Kant. It does not seem as though the mentally 
impaired could ever come to know they have this duty. If you’re going to try to take me 
down, I’ll take you down with me.” 
 
I do not think I’ve shot myself in my own foot, for it does not seem that we have some 
kind of prima facie duty to practice virtue; instead, we have a certain desire to 
flourish—we have a notion that our lives require certain contexts and realities in order 
to be fulfilled. And it seems we have certain intuitions about these ends. For instance, 
most see peaceful and loving relations with other people to be a good, and a part of 
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establishing these good relations is not killing people or stealing from them. This may 
suggest a kind of duty; that is, a forceful reason for us to act in a certain way. But if an 
individual has practiced a life of perpetual thievery and not practiced restraining their 
anger, it seems difficult to see how this individual will be able to ever achieve that facet 
of human flourishing: peaceful relations with others. So yes, we can and should identify 
particular goods that humans should strive for and not violate, but how we achieve 
those goods—which are implicit in ours natures as human beings—is a matter of virtue 
and not strict Kantian rationality. For such an emphasis on rationality surely excludes 
the mentally impaired from the moral life, but through the paradigm of virtue we can 
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